New AI Firewall Stops Data Scrapers, Ditching Futile Poisoning
Forget poisoning AI data; a new "Web AI Firewall" approach offers a potent defense against rampant data scraping.
July 8, 2025

In the escalating battle to protect online content from the voracious appetite of AI data scrapers, a growing number of creators and developers have turned to "data poisoning" as a form of digital self-defense. The technique involves deliberately corrupting datasets to sabotage the training of AI models. However, developer Xe Iaso, creator of a popular anti-bot tool, argues this approach is fundamentally flawed and ultimately ineffective. She likens the act of poisoning datasets to "peeing in the ocean," a futile gesture against the immense scale of data consumed by large language models. Instead, Iaso champions a different strategy, one focused on creating computational roadblocks that make scraping resource-intensive and impractical for bots, without harming the experience for human users.
The concept of data poisoning has gained traction as a grassroots effort to push back against the unauthorized harvesting of text and images by AI companies.[1][2] The method involves injecting malicious or manipulated data into training datasets with the aim of subtly or drastically altering an AI model's behavior.[3] This can lead to misclassification of data, reduced accuracy, and the introduction of biases, thereby degrading the overall performance and reliability of the AI system.[3][4] In theory, if enough creators poison their online content, the resulting AI models would become unreliable and less valuable. Researchers have demonstrated that manipulating as little as 0.1 percent of a model's pre-training data can be enough to launch effective data poisoning attacks.[5] This vulnerability has led to the development of tools designed to help artists and writers "poison" their work before it can be scraped. The appeal lies in its potential to not just block, but actively harm the models that many see as infringing on their intellectual property.
Despite its conceptual appeal, Iaso contends that data poisoning is a misguided and ultimately hopeless endeavor. The core of her argument rests on the sheer scale of the datasets used to train modern AI. Large language models are trained on trillions of data points scraped from the open internet, making the impact of a few thousand, or even a few million, poisoned data points statistically insignificant. AI developers use vast amounts of data, and models learn to generalize from these examples; the more data, the more refined the model becomes, as long as the data is relatively unbiased.[6] The vastness of these datasets means they can absorb a significant amount of corrupted data without a noticeable decline in overall performance.[7] Attackers might need to corrupt a substantial portion of the data to have a meaningful impact, a task that becomes nearly impossible when dealing with the petabytes of information ingested by major AI labs. The effort by individual creators to poison their own data is, in Iaso's view, a drop in a vast ocean, unlikely to cause any real damage to the final AI model.
Frustrated by the ineffectiveness of existing methods and the aggressive behavior of AI scrapers that were overwhelming her own servers, Iaso developed an alternative solution called Anubis.[8][9][10] Rather than attempting to corrupt the data, Anubis acts as a "Web AI Firewall" that protects websites by making it computationally expensive for bots to access them.[11][12][13] It works as a reverse proxy, sitting between a website and incoming traffic.[8] Before granting access, Anubis requires the visitor's browser to solve a proof-of-work challenge, essentially a small cryptographic math problem that requires JavaScript to execute.[8][13] This task is trivial for a modern web browser, causing no noticeable delay for a human user, but it presents a significant hurdle for the simple, high-volume scrapers used by many AI companies.[8] These bots are often not designed to execute JavaScript, and for those that can, the computational cost of solving the challenge for every page they want to scrape quickly becomes prohibitive, effectively stopping them in their tracks.[8][14]
The implications of this debate extend across the AI industry, touching on the ongoing legal and ethical conflicts surrounding data scraping. Iaso's tool, which has been downloaded nearly 200,000 times and is used by organizations like the GNOME Foundation and UNESCO, represents a shift in strategy from passive or retaliatory measures to active, preventative defense.[9] Anubis doesn't rely on being ignored by "well-behaved" bots that respect files like `robots.txt`; it is designed to stop the aggressive scrapers that ignore such protocols and hammer servers until they fail.[8][10] By creating an economic disincentive for scraping, making the cost of data acquisition higher than its potential value, Anubis-like tools could force a change in how AI companies approach data collection. This approach sidesteps the arms race of data poisoning and focuses on making the act of scraping itself untenable, thereby protecting the "small internet" from what Iaso describes as an "endless storm of requests."[11][9]
In conclusion, while the desire to fight back against unauthorized data scraping through methods like data poisoning is understandable, the practical realities of scale may render such efforts symbolic at best. The critique offered by developers like Xe Iaso suggests that a more effective long-term strategy lies not in polluting the data pool, but in fortifying the dams. By implementing computational hurdles, tools like Anubis aim to change the fundamental economics of web scraping. This approach seeks to make the cost of indiscriminate data harvesting prohibitively high, offering a potent defense for creators and website operators who find themselves on the front lines of the battle for control over digital content in the age of artificial intelligence. It shifts the focus from a futile attempt to spoil the data to a pragmatic mission of protecting the source.
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